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Nuclear (Geo)Political Ecologies:
A Hybrid Geography of Chinese
Investment in Namibia’s Uranium Sector 
Meredith J. DEBOOM 
Abstract: Namibia’s Husab uranium mine is the Chinese government’s 
largest investment in Africa to date. This article develops a theoretical 
framework of hybridity to analyse the (geo)political and ecological 
implications of China’s rising global influence in uranium mining. 
Drawing on multiple-methods fieldwork, the article explains how 
Husab has resuscitated Namibia’s uranium industry and facilitated the 
political goals of both Chinese and Namibian leaders. Husab’s materi-
alisation of “South–South solidarity,” however, also appears to be 
deepening the marginalisation of minority communities near uranium 
mines. Far from paradoxical, this uneven distribution of benefits and 
costs is as intertwined with nuclear geopolitics as it is with the materi-
ality of uranium mining.  
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Introduction 
Chinese investments in Africa’s extractive industries have significantly 
increased over the past decade. Political and media reactions to these 
investments have often taken binary form. Supporters have praised 
Chinese investments as examples of “South–South solidarity” and 
“development opportunity” that strengthen Africans’ agency in choos-
ing development, political, and trade partners. Detractors, by con-
trast, have portrayed these investments as “resource grabbing” by the 
Chinese government and as signifying the rise of China as a “neoco-
lonial” power. Moyo (2009), for example, argues that Chinese in-
volvement is distinct from Western involvement due to China’s em-
phasis on mutual benefit. As a result, China’s rising influence increas-
es Africans’ power to set their own development priorities. Melber 
(2011) agrees with Moyo that China’s approach differs from that of 
the West but contends that China’s goals are similarly exploitative. 
Both analyses echo broader debates in the academic and policy com-
munities over the implications of China’s rise as a world power for 
issues ranging from human rights to trade.  
While generalist analyses are useful for considering how China’s 
rise affects the global distribution of power in broad terms, they pro-
vide fewer insights into how rising Chinese investment is affecting 
Africans in particular national and subnational contexts. Fieldwork-
based research, such as that by Bräutigam (2009), Dobler (2007), and 
Carmody (2011), identifies a more convincing middle ground by illus-
trating how complex, contextual factors shape the implications of 
these investments for Africans ranging from political elites to small-
business owners. This article1 follows the model of these fieldwork-
based analyses. Specifically, I use a place-based approach to evaluate 
the (geo)political and ecological implications of rising Chinese influ-
ence in Namibia’s resurgent uranium sector.  
I draw on the political ecology, science and technology studies 
(STS), and postcolonial studies literatures on hybridity to analyse how 

1 This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Founda-
tion under Grant No. #1536313 and the Graduate Research Fellowship Pro-
gram. Additional support was provided by an American Fellowship from the 
American Association of University Women (AAUW) and a P.E.O. Scholar 
Award. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations ex-
pressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of these funding agencies. 
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Chinese investments are challenging and reinforcing the distribution 
of mining-related benefits and costs in Africa at local, national, and 
global scales. My use of hybridity is threefold, reflecting the technical 
and material senses of the term as well as its more representational 
use. In biology, hybridity refers to a mixture or composite (Hermsen 
and Ramanna 1976). I use hybridity in this sense to evaluate two fea-
tures of Chinese investments in Namibian uranium mining: the first, 
drawing on STS, is the simultaneously human and non-human nature 
of uranium mining and nuclear geopolitics; the second is the specific 
state–state ownership structure of the Husab uranium mine. This 
model, I argue, may become more common with China’s rising global 
influence. Husab’s joint government ownership structure makes it a 
hybrid of Chinese and Namibian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as 
well as a physical manifestation of the rhetoric of “South–South soli-
darity” frequently used by Chinese and African political leaders. Al-
though the mine’s ownership is unequal, with 10 per cent Namibian 
government ownership versus 90 per cent Chinese government owner-
ship, I explain how this hybrid ownership structure benefits both 
states by reinforcing each as the trustee of development for their 
respective societies.  
My final use of hybridity engages postcolonial theory to compli-
cate Namibian and Chinese government arguments that the Husab 
mine offers “mutual benefits” for the Chinese and Namibian people 
in addition to their respective states. Politicians affiliated with Namib-
ia’s ruling SWAPO party argue that Husab is the epitome of “South–
South solidarity” and a key step in Namibia’s post-independence 
economic liberation from Western and South African domination. 
Husab, these officials claim, signifies the commitment of the Namib-
ian and Chinese governments to mutual development on behalf of 
their respective nations. My analysis indicates that the mine indeed 
significantly benefits the Namibian and Chinese governments. The 
distribution of benefits and costs among the Namibian and Chinese 
populations, however, is far more uneven and reinforces existing 
inequalities in the broader realm of nuclear (geo)political ecologies. 
Husab is thus a postcolonial hybrid that signifies both the empower-
ment of the Namibian state in the global political economy of uran-
ium and the deepening of historical inequalities associated with uran-
ium extraction. It simultaneously challenges historical exploitation 
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and reinforces that very exploitation, particularly for Namibian mi-
nority communities living near uranium mines. 
The analysis demonstrates the value of a hybridity framework for 
understanding the implications of China’s rising influence in coun-
tries like Namibia. In addition to complicating our understanding of 
the (geo)political ecology of uranium extraction, I argue that this 
framework of hybridity can help us move beyond binary understand-
ings (e.g. “development opportunity” versus “neocolonialism”) of 
what China’s rise means for the world. 
China–Namibia Relations and Chinese
Investments in Namibian Uranium 
Several Namibia-focused scholars and activists have critically analysed 
China–Namibia relations over the past decade. This research includes 
Dobler’s (2007) fieldwork on how Chinese merchants are shaping 
trade patterns and social relations in northern Namibia and his more 
recent (2017) analysis of historical China–Namibia ties, Melber’s 
(2017) analysis of China’s “all-weather” friendship with Namibia, and 
several reports by Namibian non-governmental organisations, includ-
ing Jauch and Sakaria (2009). Namibia has received relatively little 
attention, however, in the popular China–Africa literature, excluding 
a case study of Chinese migrants in Namibia in French’s (2014) Chi-
na’s Second Continent and a recent feature on China–Namibia relations 
by Larmer (2017) in The New York Times Magazine. The lack of atten-
tion to Namibia–China relations is particularly stark compared to 
Chinese investments in African resource producers such as Zambia 
(Carmody 2011), Sudan (Carmody and Taylor 2010), and Angola 
(Corkin 2013). The lack of popular attention is likely related to Na-
mibia’s small population of 2.5 million, its relative political stability 
since its 1990 independence, and the recent nature of major Chinese 
resource investments in Namibia, all of which have kept it out of the 
global limelight. It is almost certainly not due to a lack of Chinese 
influence in Namibia. 
China is Namibia’s fastest-growing trade partner and investment 
source. As shown in Figure 1, US–Namibia trade was double China–
Namibia trade in 2002. Today, China–Namibia trade is more than 
double US–Namibia trade, having increased tenfold between 2003 
and 2010 alone. In 2015, a representative of the Chinese embassy in 
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Namibia estimated that there were more than 50 Chinese companies 
in Namibia, generating over 1 billion USD in annual revenue (Ano-
nymous 1 2017). Although small Chinese businesses operate in Na-
mibia’s construction and retail sectors (Jaunch and Sakaria 2009), 
China’s largest individual investments in Namibia are in the mining 
sector (Sherbourne 2013). These investments include the 4.6 billion 
USD Husab uranium mine, the Chinese government’s largest single 
investment in Africa to date.  
Figure 1. China and US Trade with Namibia (2002–2015) 
 
Source: China–Africa Research Initiative 2017. 
Chinese investments in Namibia’s uranium sector over the past 10 
years have put Namibia on track to become the world’s second-lar-
gest uranium producer by 2020 (Anonymous 3 2014). As recently as 
late 2003, though, the outlook for Namibia’s uranium sector was 
starkly different. Although Namibia has been a globally significant 
producer of uranium since 1976, the end of the Cold War, the de-
commissioning of nuclear weapons stockpiles (and resultant enriched 
uranium supply glut), and the aftermath of the Three Mile Island and 
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Chernobyl accidents depressed uranium prices throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s (WNA 2016). By 2001, uranium had reached an all-time 
low of 7 USD per pound. Low prices, combined with Namibia’s rela-
tively high production costs, brought its uranium industry to the 
verge of collapse just a few years into the new millennium. Even the 
Rössing mine, then the world’s largest, announced in 2003 that it 
would end its Namibian operations in 2007 due to falling prices.  
Rössing’s announcement proved premature. By 2004, rising Chi-
nese demand had catalysed a bullish uranium market. Price specula-
tion related to concerns about air pollution and carbon dioxide emis-
sions from coal plants in China and elsewhere put further upward 
pressure on the uranium market (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins 
2012: 197). Uranium prices increased from 10 to 135 USD per pound 
between 2003 and 2007, triggering a veritable “uranium rush” (Conde 
and Kallis 2012: 596). New exploration projects increased global 
reserves by 15 per cent between 2005 and 2007, and Namibia was no 
exception. Its Ministry of Mines and Energy granted nearly 60 new 
uranium-prospecting and uranium-mining licences, representing a 
quadrupling in investment, between 2004 and 2011 alone (MME 
2010). In 2006, Paladin Energy’s Langer Heinrich mine in Namibia 
became the world’s first conventional uranium mine to open in two 
decades. By 2012, Namibia was the world’s fifth-largest uranium 
producer (Conde and Kallis 2012).  
Beyond China’s influence on global uranium prices, private and 
state Chinese investments directly contributed to Namibia’s boom. In 
2004, Rio Tinto’s Rössing mine became the first Western-owned 
mine to directly export uranium to the Chinese government. In 2008, 
China’s state-owned Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco) 
deepened this relationship by purchasing a 12 per cent stake in Rio 
Tinto. This investment was followed by the 2008 establishment of a 
uranium exploration subsidiary by the state-owned China Uranium 
Corporation Ltd (SinoU). Chinese private companies followed the 
lead of Chinese SOEs. In 2010, for example, the Sichuan Hanlong 
Group conglomerate acquired an 18 per cent stake in the Australian-
owned Marenica Energy mine. 
Increased production in Namibia and elsewhere was not without 
consequence for the uranium market. By February 2011, oversupply 
had reduced uranium prices to 72 USD per pound. The oversupply 
situation worsened in the wake of the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear 
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disaster in Japan. By 2014, uranium prices had tumbled 60 per cent to 
nearly 30 USD per pound. In addition to losing Japan as an export 
market when its 50 nuclear plants went idle, Namibia’s entire mining 
sector contracted by 10 per cent in the year after Fukushima. Uran-
ium prices have dropped in subsequent years, hovering around 15–25 
USD per pound as of late 2017. When the uranium price dips below 
40 USD per pound, more than half of the world’s uranium mines, 
including all of Namibia’s mines, operate below the break-even point 
(WNA 2016). Exploration and development projects have been halt-
ed in Namibia and around the world, with few signs of an imminent 
recovery.  
Namibia’s situation would seem to be particularly dire in this 
global context. Its uranium deposits have unusually low concentra-
tions relative to mines elsewhere and do not occur in combination 
with other valuable minerals, as in South Africa’s gold-bearing ores 
(WNA 2016). As a result, Namibia’s uranium mines operate at higher 
costs than those in Canada, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere. Yet, Namib-
ia’s uranium industry has not dried up. In fact, after steep declines in 
2012 and 2013, the sector is now growing. This paradox is explained 
by the strategic post-Fukushima influx of Chinese investments. In 
January 2014, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) Over-
seas Uranium Holding Ltd acquired a 25 per cent stake in Paladin 
Resources’ Langer Heinrich mine, making it possible for the new 
mine to continue production despite below-break-even prices. Even 
more importantly, China’s state-owned China General Nuclear Power 
Corporation (CGNPC) took advantage of low prices in 2014 to begin 
construction on the Husab mine. After describing my theoretical 
framework, data, and methods in the subsequent sections, I analyse 
the implications of Husab and of Chinese investments in Namibian 
uranium through the lens of human–environment hybridity, owner-
ship hybridity, and postcolonial hybridity. 
Data and Methods 
This analysis draws on two years of fieldwork in Namibia between 
May 2011 and January 2017. I collected data through participant ob-
servation, focus groups, interviews, and textual analysis. These meth-
ods helped me to identify formal, informal, and lived discourses and 
experiences of uranium mining and Chinese investment. Textual data 
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included private and state media, official statements, stakeholder and 
company documents, and archival research. Participant observation 
included guided visits to mining sites and Chinese investment pro-
jects. I also attended mining- and development-related gatherings, 
including meetings of Namibia’s Chamber of Mines, the 2015 Forum 
on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and the 2015 China–Africa 
Development Models Seminar.  
I analysed texts and transcripts using NVivo software, which fa-
cilitated coding the content for patterns and themes across data types 
and sources. I initially used an open call for focus group participants 
but found focus groups among previously aligned groups (see Gam-
son 1992 and Kitzinger 1994) to be more successful. These more 
naturally occurring groups relied less on my interventions, and post-
focus group evaluations revealed that they more closely mirrored 
conversations that participants might have with colleagues and ac-
quaintances. I conducted semi-structured interviews with representa-
tives from the foreign and domestic mining industry, the government, 
and civil society, as well as with ordinary citizens. While I recorded 
most interviews with government officials, who often employed offi-
cial talking points, I relied on notes in other cases to increase partici-
pants’ comfort. Interviews lasted from 10 to 90 minutes and were 
designed to begin by talking around potentially sensitive topics to 
build participant comfort. While local assistants helped me recruit 
and coordinate participants, I conducted all interviews and focus 
groups myself. 
Towards a Postcolonial Hybrid Geography  
Merriam-Webster defines a hybrid as “something heterogeneous in 
origin or composition” (2017). Social scientists have used the concept 
of hybridity to challenge binary categories since at least the 1980s, 
when actor-network theorists like Bruno Latour and John Law began 
to complicate human/non-human entanglements. For Latour (1993: 
10), the categorisation of nature and society as “two entirely distinct 
ontological zones” is central to modernity itself. Instead of assuming 
that humans are the world’s primary actors, STS scholars like Callon 
(1984) argue that non-human actants, ranging from scallops to weeds, 
shape outcomes in ways that cannot be controlled or predicted by 
humans alone. While actor-network theory (ANT) provides valuable 
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insights into nature–society relations, its attention to inequality and 
structure has been identified as less developed by political ecologists 
who view power relations as central to environmental debates (Lave 
2015). For these scholars, endowing non-humans with agency 
does not seem appropriate for capturing the dynamic properties 
of “non-living natures” such as landfill leachate, acid mine wastes, 
or groundwater flow – biophysical properties that are not living, 
but which have a dynamic that entangles them with other beings 
and things in ways that give them political life. (Bakker and Bridge 
2006: 11) 
Recent beyond-human and post-human investigations and new ma-
terialist analyses have addressed this gap by demonstrating how 
ANT’s versatility for engaging with the non-human can be integrated 
into political ecology’s emphasis on power relations. Attention to 
materiality does not require sacrificing attention to power relations, as 
Swyngedouw (2004), Robbins (2007), and Guthman (2004) have all 
demonstrated. 
My first engagement with hybridity builds on the contributions 
above to evaluate how uranium mining’s material and human charac-
teristics combine to shape its (geo)political ecology. This use of hy-
bridity specifically reflects political ecologists’ and STS scholars’ use 
of the concept to analyse how “the material and the social intertwine 
and interact in all manner of promiscuous combinations” (Thrift 
1996: 24, cited in Whatmore 2002: 4). Examples of these human/ 
non-human hybrids range from microbe/human assemblages (Ingram 
2007) and genetically modified foods (Blok and Jensen 2011) to pets 
(Haraway 2003) and fossil-fuelled democracy (Mitchell 2011). Aug-
menting STS theorisations of human/non-human hybridity with 
political ecology’s focus on power relations ensures that analyses of 
human/non-human entanglements do not overlook how structures 
shape outcomes.  
Hybrids need not be limited, however, to the human/non-
human interface. Postcolonial theorists have also engaged with hy-
bridity, using the term to challenge dualisms like coloniser/colonised 
(Bhabha 1994), West/Rest (Hall 1992), and ruler/ruled (Bayart 1989). 
I use hybridity in this second sense to evaluate the Husab uranium 
mine as a material hybrid that complicates simple distinctions be-
tween the Namibian state and the Chinese state. Beyond the mine’s 
composite ownership, I argue that the mine’s joint ownership struc-
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ture offers mutual benefits to both the Namibian and Chinese gov-
ernments. In this way, its benefits align with the “mutual aid” rhetoric 
frequently promoted by Chinese and African political leaders. 
My final engagement with hybridity, however, complicates inter-
pretations that Husab’s hybrid ownership and shared state benefits 
entail a full break with historical patterns of exploitation. Postcoloni-
alism interrogates hybridisation and colonialism alike as processes 
that are necessarily contingent and multidirectional. Comaroff and 
Comaroff (1997), for example, use hybridity to analyse the simultane-
ous absorption and rejection of a coloniser’s culture. Mbembe (2001) 
uses postcolonial theory to critique assumptions that colonialism 
spread purely through coercive violence. Instead, he argues that colo-
nialism was transnationally implemented, with the colonised exercis-
ing degrees of agency (albeit limited) in its implementation. Using 
hybridity in this second postcolonial sense makes it possible to simi-
larly complicate contemporary China–Africa relations. It facilitates 
the deconstruction of binary thinking that evaluates China–Africa 
relations as solely exploitative or universally liberating. Instead, again 
following Mbembe (2001), postcolonial hybridity makes it possible to 
evaluate how contemporary China–Africa relations may liberate some 
who were formerly exploited (such as officials of the Namibian state) 
while deepening and/or reinforcing the exploitation of others (such 
as Namibian minority communities living near uranium mines). These 
three understandings of hybridity – as human/non-human mixture, 
as state–state ownership and beneficiary composite, and as simultan-
eously breaking with and deepening historical relationships of exploi-
tation – facilitate the subsequent analysis. 
Human–Environment Hybridity: Implications of 
Rising China for Uranium Geopolitics 
Recent scholarship in political ecology has called for investigating 
how resources are discursively and materially securitised within polit-
ical economies (Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). Uranium is a quintes-
sential hybrid human/non-human resource whose securitisation has 
historically been a high global priority. As the 51st-most abundant 
element in the Earth’s crust (tied with tin), uranium is approximately 
40 times more abundant than silver. It is widely distributed, albeit 
typically at very low concentrations. Its distinctiveness lies not in its 
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rarity but instead in the key physical property – radioactivity – that 
endows it with social life. Its radioactivity is in turn given meaning 
through the social construction of what Hecht (2009) refers to as 
“nuclearity,” or the “apparently immutable ontology [that] has long 
distinguished nuclear things from non-nuclear things” (Hecht 2009: 
897). Uranium’s intertwined material properties and social meaning 
have made it one of the world’s most important commodities in war 
and security. Today, that importance is being extended through its 
role in climate change mitigation via intensified use of nuclear power 
in China and beyond. The distribution of the benefits and costs of 
this production, however, has shifted significantly since the dawn of 
the nuclear age in 1945. 
While global South countries such as Namibia, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and Niger have exported uranium for dec-
ades, Cold War uranium extraction was concentrated in Western 
countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, and Soviet 
states such as Kazakhstan and Russia until the 1970s. The United 
States was the world’s largest uranium producer from 1953 to 1980, 
with its peak production occurring in 1960 (Finch et al. 1973). Like 
the role played by nature-exporting states in the development of capi-
talism (Coronil 1997), uranium-exporting states in the global South 
were essential to the development of nuclear technologies but were 
deemed fundamentally separate from the nuclear geopolitics in which 
Cold War powers were engaged (Hecht 2012). Per this logic, Namibia 
was a producer of uranium, but it was not a nuclear state.  
By the 1970s, however, the United States, Australia, and Canada 
faced growing public pressure over environmental and health con-
cerns related to uranium mining, nuclear weapons testing, and nuclear 
energy generation (Conde and Kallis 2012; Hecht 2012). At the end 
of the Cold War, the United States responded to these concerns by 
passing the 1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which re-
quired awarding 100,000 USD to uranium miners diagnosed with 
cancer or respiratory disorders. Australia responded to similar criti-
cisms by implementing a nearly 25-year ban on new uranium mines 
that was only recently lifted. With domestic production declining, 
former major producers such as the United States began to imple-
ment the import-dependent sourcing model long used by former 
colonial powers such as France. These transitions effectively trans-
ferred the burden of uranium production from the global North, 
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where most uranium is used, to the global South, where safety and 
environmental regulations are less constraining. This process contin-
ues today. Despite this new sourcing model, though, the separation 
between nuclear and non-nuclear countries identified by Hecht 
(2009) remained in place. As late as 1995, the United States did not 
consider Namibia to be relevant to discussions of energy security, 
even though it produced nearly 10 per cent of global uranium that 
year (MME 2010). 
Uranium geopolitics shifted again on 11 September 2001, as 
Western governments became increasingly concerned with the possi-
bility of terrorist groups and “rogue” states acquiring nuclear fuel. 
Despite pressures to reduce Western reliance on strategic foreign 
resources in the early 2000s, officials in the United States and Austral-
ia prioritised securing global South uranium sources over accepting 
the risks of re-intensified domestic extraction. The push to secure 
global South uranium sources did not, however, increase the relative 
power of exporting states. Without an OPEC-like cartel, uranium-
exporting countries have instead been subjected to growing surveil-
lance and intervention by uranium importers. The 2003 Niger yellow-
cake scare ushered in a new era of US intervention to secure uranium 
networks (Hecht 2012). In Namibia, this included stationing semi-
permanent US security officials at the Rössing uranium mine, in 
which the Iranian government owns a 15 per cent stake, after a ura-
nium theft was reported. As over 30 per cent of Rössing’s uranium is 
destined for US markets, its Rio Tinto owners had little choice but to 
comply. 
Uranium geopolitics are shifting yet again today with three inter-
connected developments: China’s increasing global influence, its ris-
ing domestic living standards, and its industrialisation-fuelled envir-
onmental challenges (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins 2012). Coal 
supplies 73 per cent of China’s domestic energy demand (WNA 
2017a). In response to growing domestic concerns over pollution and 
carbon emissions, China’s leadership has prioritised reducing energy-
related pollution in recent years and aims to reduce 2020 carbon 
emissions by 40 to 45 per cent from 2005 levels (Financial Times 
2016). Uranium’s “clean energy” potential makes it essential to Chi-
na’s continued pursuit of industrialisation and improved living condi-
tions for its population without worsening air pollution. Furthermore, 
nuclear energy supports China’s rebranding as a global energy leader, 
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supporting its geopolitical status as a rising world leader. Nuclear and 
renewable energy sources are now expected to provide 95 per cent of 
the 420 Gigawatt electrical (GWe) of generation capacity that China 
will add by 2020 (WNA 2017a). Construction of at least 21 additional 
nuclear power facilities will increase China’s nuclear power capacity 
from 31 GWe in 2016 to an anticipated 150 GWe by 2030 and 400 to 
500 GWe by 2050 (WNA 2017a). It aims to have 110 reactors in 
operation by 2030, compared to 37 today (Larmer 2017). The associ-
ated increase in China’s uranium needs is anticipated to make it the 
world’s second-largest uranium consumer after the United States by 
2020 (Anonymous 2 2015). 
The implications of this shift in uranium geopolitics may extend 
beyond Namibia, where China began to challenge the historical dom-
inance of South African, British, American, Australian, French, Japa-
nese, and Canadian interests in Namibian uranium mining in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. China’s rise as a nuclear energy 
power may even challenge the nuclear/non-nuclear binary described 
by Hecht (2009). In April 2017, Swakop Uranium, the China–Namib-
ia partnership that owns the Husab mine, submitted initial plans to 
Namibia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy for a nuclear power plant in 
Namibia (Kaira 2017). Current Namibian president Hage Geingob 
first expressed interest in such a plan in 2014 when he toured China’s 
Dayawan Nuclear Power Plant, which is managed by Swakop Uran-
ium’s parent company, CGNPC. If a Namibian nuclear power plant 
is approved, it would become only the second nuclear energy power 
station in Africa after South Africa’s Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, 
which was commissioned in 1984. Like China, African countries face 
rapidly escalating demands from their populations for energy provi-
sion. While future population pressures will play a larger role in in-
creasing demand in Africa than in China, African countries and China 
face a similar need to increase living standards and support industrial-
isation without aggravating air pollution and climate change prob-
lems. Namibia’s relative stability and uranium resources make it well-
suited for Africa’s second power plant, but it may not be the only 
African nuclear power plant proposed in partnership with the Chi-
nese government. If further plans emerge and are implemented, Chi-
na’s rise as a nuclear energy power could challenge the power differ-
ential that has long separated African uranium exporters from the 
nuclear powers of the world. 
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Hybrid Ownership and Hybrid Benefits:  
The Husab Uranium Mine 
Husab is the world’s fifth-largest primary uranium deposit and is 
expected to become the world’s second-largest uranium mine when it 
reaches full production in 2018. It will produce an estimated 15 mil-
lion pounds of uranium over a 20-year lifespan. Including construc-
tion costs, CGNPC’s investment in Husab is expected to exceed 4.6 
billion USD (Anonymous 3 2014). This makes Husab both the largest 
single Chinese government investment project in sub-Saharan Africa 
to date and the largest-ever post-independence investment in Namib-
ia. Unlike most mines in sub-Saharan Africa, Husab’s ownership 
structure is entirely state-based. Operating under the Swakop Uran-
ium moniker, the mine is owned 90 per cent by CGNPC and 10 per 
cent by Epangelo, Namibia’s state-owned mining company, inaugur-
ated in 2008. This hybrid ownership structure makes Husab a materi-
alisation of the rhetoric of “South–South solidarity” that Chinese and 
African actors often use to characterise their relationships.  
Reflecting its dual state ownership structure and the “mutual 
aid” rhetoric often employed by Chinese officials to describe China–
Africa relationships (Strauss 2009), Husab’s benefits are also hybrid. 
For the Chinese government, as noted above, Husab is an opportuni-
ty to secure a consistent uranium source to fuel its nuclear power 
ambitions and to reduce domestic carbon emissions and pollution. It 
also presents an opportunity to sell future uranium on the world 
market despite China’s limited domestic supplies. In July 2014, 
CGNPC established the UK-based CGN Global Uranium Ltd to 
facilitate future Husab uranium sales. This outlet provides CGNPC 
with a hedge. If uranium prices rise dramatically or if China’s nuclear 
power development plans change, CGNPC can sell Husab’s uranium 
on the world market. In the meantime, and with uranium prices near 
record lows, Husab enables CGNPC to inexpensively increase its 
uranium stockpiles. If prices rise, CGNPC will be able to sell Husab’s 
uranium at a premium while using its uranium stockpiles to fuel its 
domestic nuclear power plants.  
The 90/10 ownership structure of Husab may suggest that the 
Chinese government is its primary beneficiary. Yet, despite its mere 
10 per cent stake, the Namibian government may be deriving even 
greater benefits from Husab than the Chinese government is. As 
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mentioned previously, the mine has played a key role in staving off 
collapse for Namibia’s uranium industry. Husab will singlehandedly 
double Namibia’s uranium output and provide an estimated 700 mil-
lion USD in yearly government revenues through Epangelo (Ano-
nymous 4 2015). This amount is roughly equivalent to 20 per cent of 
Namibia’s total export revenue and 5 per cent of Namibia’s GDP. 
Husab will also help the Namibian government diversify its sources 
of mining revenue, which has historically come primarily from just 
two companies: the Namdeb diamond-mining partnership with De-
Beers and the Rössing uranium mine. A uranium industry representa-
tive with whom I spoke at the 2014 Chamber of Mines conference 
was hopeful that Husab’s opening would enable the uranium industry 
to finally experience the “political might” long enjoyed by Namibia’s 
diamond industry (Anonymous 5 2014). Husab’s CGNPC ownership 
should also provide a consistent export market in an industry that has 
been notoriously unpredictable in the past decade.  
Husab’s greatest benefit for the Namibian government, however, 
may lie in the opportunity it presents to increase the state’s direct role 
in mining. Namibia’s pursuit of this increased state role follows the 
precedent set by China itself in using its SOEs as a tool of both in-
dustrialisation and the consolidation of state power. Beyond revenue 
and access to uranium, Husab is an opportunity for elites in both 
countries to secure their statuses as the trustees of development and 
national interest. Both governments rely on resources – Namibia for 
export earnings, China for industrialisation – to support their domes-
tic economies and provide political legitimacy for their ruling parties. 
As Africa’s fourth-largest exporter of non-fuel minerals, Namibia’s 
government is particularly dependent on mining, which provides 
nearly 60 per cent of its export earnings. As elsewhere in Africa, each 
of Namibia’s mines is a 
site of intense investment and state-aided control […and] a linch-
pin of the economy that provides the state with the much-needed 
revenues that in turn affect the credibility and legitimacy of the 
state. (Ramutsindela 2013: A1) 
Reflecting the importance of mining in Namibia’s economy, its ruling 
SWAPO party has long used mining as a tool of political power. 
Since the end of the first decade of the 2000s, though, the Namibian 
government has sought opportunities to play a larger ownership role 
in Namibia’s mining industry. In March 2009, the government allo-
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cated 200,000 USD to establish a state-owned mining company called 
Epangelo. Epangelo translates as “government” from Oshiwambo, 
Namibia’s most commonly spoken first language. Erikki Nghimtina, 
then minister of mines and energy, explained Epangelo’s establish-
ment by noting that 
with changing dynamics in the global mining industry our thinking 
on the role Government plays with respect to the management 
and exploitation of resources have [sic] gone through an evolu-
tion. […] in dealing with other countries we learned how their 
state mining enterprises […] play a significant role in the devel-
opment of their mining industries and their ability to generate sig-
nificant revenue for their fiscus. (The Namibian 2009) 
Nghimtina later identified the state-owned mining entities of China, 
Angola, and Russia as inspirations for Epangelo.  
Both Namibian and Chinese officials have reinforced China’s 
role as a development model for Namibia. SWAPO officials com-
monly frame China as a trusted partner in Namibia’s development 
and, in the words of Deputy Parliament Speaker Loide Kasingo, as a 
“true and loyal friend of the Namibian people” (Namibia Economist 
2012: 1). In addition to the Chinese government’s support for 
Epangelo’s ownership stake in Husab, rhetoric of friendship also 
stems from Namibian officials’ seemingly genuine support for Chi-
na’s development model, which prominently featured mining SOEs 
in the pursuit of industrialisation and growth (Power, Mohan, and 
Tan-Mullins 2012). In October 2015, I attended “The Development 
Path: China–Africa Development Models Seminar” in Namibia dur-
ing the lead-up to the FOCAC in Johannesburg, South Africa. The 
day-long event was jointly sponsored by the Chinese Embassy and 
the University of Namibia and attracted approximately 250 attendees, 
primarily youth. During his opening address, Chinese ambassador to 
Namibia Xin Shunkang proclaimed that for, 
66 years, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, 
the Chinese people have been striving with bold innovation and 
practice and have found the best development path for our own 
[…]. […] China is now the second-biggest economy, the first 
[leading] trading [country] with [the] largest foreign reserve, and 
the third-biggest investing country in the world. China’s overall 
national strength and state leadership realised [this] historic leap 
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forward. […] China is proud to support Namibia on its own de-
velopment path. 
Namibian officials have echoed this state leadership argument to 
both justify an increased Namibian state role in mining and to portray 
China as a loyal partner whose investments are motivated by a com-
mitment to mutual development. After receiving a courtesy call from 
outgoing Chinese ambassador Xin Shunkang in March 2016, Namib-
ian president Hage Geingob stated that he wished to “challenge all 
other colleagues from the international community to emanate [sic] 
what and how the Chinese friends are showing and helping us in 
many ways” (Xinhua 2016). A Namibian economic development offi-
cial reinforced this message, explaining to me that working with Chi-
na on a development project is like working with an older cousin 
who, “although you may feel he is better off, he does not look down 
on you. He is your comrade and cares for your ideas” (Anonymous 7 
2015). References to comradeship are common in Namibian officials’ 
portrayals of China and frame both the Chinese and Namibian states 
as trusted providers of development. 
Namibia’s shift toward state-led extraction is part of a broader 
trend toward resource nationalism and “neo-extractivism” across 
Africa and Latin America (Burchardt and Dietz 2014). In Namibia, 
this shift has been materially facilitated by Chinese investment in the 
uranium sector. Beyond the Chinese government’s role as a model 
for state-led extraction, Husab’s hybrid ownership structure has cata-
lysed Epangelo’s growth from a 200,000 USD start-up to a major 
player in Namibia’s mining sector. Drawing on the example of China, 
Namibian officials have identified increased state ownership in the 
mining sector through Epangelo as the crucial link between mining 
and broad-based development for the Namibian people.  
Political ecology scholarship on the politics of knowledge helps 
to explain how and why mining has come to be understood as key to 
Namibia’s development. In addition to shaping how knowledge is 
circulated and applied, political actors are entangled in the production 
of knowledge itself. As a result, “ideas about proper resource use (or, 
indeed, about what constitutes a resource in the first place) are them-
selves the products of particular sociocultural histories” (Nadasdy 
2011: 130). As in many postcolonial states, the Namibian state’s legit-
imacy is derived in large part from its efforts to promote develop-
ment (Cooper 2002). Prior to independence, SWAPO framed mining 
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as antithetical to development. This meant that there was no such 
thing as “proper” resource use; mining was inherently exploitative.  
Since independence, though, SWAPO has pursued a develop-
ment model focused on industrialisation and economic growth (NPC 
2004). Today, SWAPO officials frame economic growth through 
mining as essential for reducing Namibia’s 51 per cent unemployment 
rate, approximately 50 per cent poverty rate, and world’s third-highest 
level of income inequality. As long as mining produces economic 
growth, SWAPO can characterise mining as a driver of development 
without losing its political legitimacy. To counter rising concerns over 
inequality associated with foreign investment in recent years (De-
Boom 2013), SWAPO leaders have repurposed Namibia’s Vision 
2030 planning document to justify an increased state role in mining. 
Vision 2030 broadly states that the government must ensure that 
“Namibia’s mineral resources are strategically exploited and optimally 
beneficiated.” The plan argues that, through strategic government 
management, mining will “provide equitable opportunities for all 
Namibians to participate in the industry, while ensuring that envir-
onmental impacts are minimised,” and claims that mining invest-
ments “are made to develop other sustainable industries and human 
capital for long-term national development” (NPC 2004: 43). By 
reframing “proper” resource extraction as one defined by the state 
playing a key role, Namibian officials have redefined the relationship 
between mining and development. Unlike mining under the apartheid 
regime, mining under the SWAPO government is no longer inherent-
ly exploitative. Instead, it can be a driver of economic liberation.  
Husab’s greatest hybrid benefit, then, lies less in its ownership 
structure and more in its reinforcement of the political legitimacy of 
both the Namibian and Chinese states. For the Chinese state, uran-
ium from Husab will reinforce the Chinese government as the pro-
vider of higher living standards for its people and, at the same time, 
as the provider of improved health and global leadership through 
reduced air pollution and lowered carbon emissions. For the Namibi-
an government, Husab reinforces the state as the critical link to en-
sure Namibian resources are used for the broad-based development 
of the Namibian people. An official at Namibia’s Ministry of Mines 
and Energy told me during an interview that projects like Husab will 
enable the Namibian government to achieve its goal of “extracting 
more value from natural resources so as to finance government and 
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thus make possible the lifting of the Namibian people out of pov-
erty” (Anonymous 6 2015). When I pressed the official on the con-
nection between increased government revenue from mining and 
poverty reduction, he replied, somewhat bewildered, that “govern-
ment is the people. As government benefits, so the people are benefi-
ciaries.” While the 90/10 ownership of the Husab mine may suggest 
that the Chinese government is benefitting the most from the ar-
rangement, SWAPO officials have gleaned additional benefits from 
Husab by using it to reinforce the Namibian state as the trustee of 
mining-led development. 
Postcolonial Hybridity: The Local Costs of 
State-Led, Uranium-Based Development 
Husab’s hybrid ownership challenges the historical geopolitics of 
uranium mining and nuclear power while providing hybrid benefits to 
both the Namibian and Chinese states. Beyond these benefits, Na-
mibian and Chinese officials have also framed the mine as providing 
broad-based development to Namibians in the spirit of “South–
South solidarity.” Officials frame these benefits as accruing at both 
the national level, through the increased government revenue de-
scribed above, and the local level for communities located near the 
mine. During his 2015 FOCAC address, Namibian president Hage 
Geingob declared,   
The mine was opened in a desolate area characterised by barren 
hills and mountains amongst which a modern highway has been 
built, leading to life. This mine has brought meaning and purpose 
to the life of previously unemployed Namibians. (Geingob 2015) 
Chinese representatives with whom I spoke made similar arguments. 
One Husab representative was particularly excited to share the com-
pany’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes with me, 
including training programmes in China for select Namibian employ-
ees. Husab is just one example of the growing emphasis that Chinese 
companies are putting on CSR (Tan-Mullins 2014). “This project will 
make the community better,” the representative told me. “And Na-
mibians are involved at all the levels. Our vice president is himself a 
Namibian!” (Anonymous 8 2014). Other representatives noted the 
poverty of local livelihoods, which primarily consist of artisanal min-
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ing, subsistence agriculture, and livestock herding. Both Namibian 
and Chinese officials emphasised that Husab will bring local commu-
nities into the formal wage economy. A Windhoek-based Namibian 
government representative claimed the mine would create 10,000 
permanent jobs for Namibians. This would be a significant improve-
ment for an area he characterised as “jobless”: “There is nothing to 
do. The people must surely want better” (Anonymous 9 2015).  
Despite this rhetoric, the benefits and costs of increased uranium 
mining in Namibia are unequally distributed. In fact, the very transi-
tion to state-led, resource-based development that the Husab mine is 
facilitating – and that SWAPO leaders cite as key to broad-based 
development – may harm rather than benefit the Namibians most 
affected by intensified uranium mining: those working in the mines 
and living in nearby communities. Like the postcolonial hybrids theo-
rised by Mbembe (2001), Husab’s challenge to exploitative historical 
mining-ownership structures may further exploit the very communi-
ties the mine is proclaimed to benefit. Furthermore, because Epange-
lo’s involvement in Husab strengthens the state’s legitimacy as the 
provider of mining-led development to Namibians, alternative under-
standings of what uranium extraction means for development may 
increasingly be rendered “extremist” or “marginal” to national politi-
cal debates.  
As noted previously regarding human/non-human hybridity, 
uranium is not only a geopolitical commodity. It is also a material 
resource, the extraction of which has physical implications. The costs 
of intensified uranium mining in Namibia are shaped by these materi-
al realities. Uranium is nearly twice as dense as lead. In low concen-
trations, as in Namibia, it is exceedingly difficult and expensive to 
extract (WNA 2017b). According to the World Nuclear Association 
(2016), concentrations of 2 per cent or higher are classified as “high 
grade,” while concentrations between 0.1 per cent and 2 per cent are 
“low grade.” Ores classified as “very high grade,” as in Canada, have 
concentrations of 20 per cent or higher. Namibia’s mines, by con-
trast, are classified as “very low grade,” with typical concentrations at 
or below 0.01 per cent. At approximately 100 uranium parts per mil-
lion (ppm), Namibian concentrations are closer to granite, which has 
uranium concentrations of three to five ppm, than to high-grade ores, 
which have uranium concentrations of approximately 20,000 ppm. 
Due to these low concentrations, Namibia’s uranium mines require 
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far more water for extraction than mines elsewhere (Mudd and Dis-
endorf 2008; Conde and Kallis 2012). Water requirements are aggra-
vated by the open-pit design of Namibia’s mines. Open-pit mines are 
preferred when uranium deposits are close to the surface, as in Na-
mibia, because they have lower levels of radon gas than underground 
mines. Unfortunately, they also produce far more dust than under-
ground mines, particularly in the desert environment where Namibian 
uranium mining occurs. The unusually high volumes of water re-
quired to extract Namibian uranium and suppress dust significantly 
reduce regional aquifers (Wippel and Suchanek 2009). 
Without Chinese investments, Namibia’s environmentally pre-
carious and relatively inefficient uranium industry would almost sure-
ly have ended in the wake of the Fukushima market collapse. Its 
mines have been operating at below break-even for nearly a decade. 
The combination of high-cost production due to Namibian uranium’s 
low concentrations, expensive environmental limitations (e.g. water 
scarcity, high-dust environment), and low global prices should have 
spelled the end for the industry. Chinese investment has forestalled 
this demise, with implications for miners and local communities. 
Dangers for nuclear industry employees are typically associated 
with downstream radiation leakage or nuclear meltdowns (Hecht 
2009). This can lead us to overlook the dangers of uranium extrac-
tion. The material characteristics of Namibian uranium combine with 
natural-social environments to produce risks that are embodied by 
miners. In addition to the airborne transmission of radon gas, radio-
active particles, and heavy metal residues associated with open-pit 
mines, the chemical leaching process used to extract uranium in Na-
mibia can release further radon gas and carbon dioxide (Brugge, de 
Lemos, and Oldmixon 2005). Chemical leaching entails spraying acid 
over extracted ore to separate the uranium and produce yellowcake 
for fuel-grade stock. The resulting heaps contain heavy metals and 
radioactive elements (Mudd and Disendorf 2008). The need for heap 
leaching is itself shaped by the material characteristics of Namibian 
uranium; it is the cost-saving measure (versus traditional milling oper-
ations) that makes Namibia’s low-concentration deposits viable. De-
spite these dangers, mines are not subject to the strict employee safe-
ty regulations applied to nuclear power plants, because mine em-
ployment is classified at exposure levels below 100 mSv (millisieverts) 
(Conde and Kallis 2012).  
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Furthermore, reflecting a nuclear geopolitics of knowledge that 
centres on uranium’s users rather than its producers, technologies to 
monitor miners’ safety are far less advanced than those at nuclear 
power plants (Hecht 2012). Geiger counters, for example, are not 
suited to accurately account for the unequal spatial distribution of 
risks within a mine. The workers at highest risk were overwhelmingly 
black during apartheid in Namibia, and they will likely be Namibian 
rather than Chinese employees in new mines such as Husab (Ano-
nymous 10 2014). The risks of long-term, low-level radiation expo-
sure, as occurs in individuals who work in uranium mines for up-
wards of 30 years, are also understudied (EPA 2016). The Interna-
tional Commission for Radiological Protection notes that it is scien-
tifically reasonable to assume that the incidence of cancer and/or 
hereditary disorders rises in proportion to increasing exposure, even 
at levels below 100 mSv (Wrixon 2008). Testing for long-term expo-
sure requires expensive and painful bone sampling that is rarely cov-
ered by employee health services. Due to the extended time over 
which exposure effects emerge, it is difficult to directly link cancers, 
liver damage, chemical toxicity, and respiratory disorders to uranium 
mining, particularly in communities characterised by contributing 
health factors such as poverty and inadequate nutrition (Hecht 2009). 
While average poverty rates in the Erongo region, where uranium 
mining occurs, are low relative to the rest of Namibia, poverty in 
Erongo has a more unequal spatial distribution than elsewhere in the 
country. Erongo’s poverty is concentrated in the rural communities, 
most with minority populations, that surround Namibia’s uranium 
mines (Ministry of Finance 2008).  
Uranium mining’s health and environmental effects extend to 
nearby communities. Soil naturally contains trace amounts of uran-
ium that can be transmitted to humans through contact, inhalation, 
or diet, but homes near mines have significantly higher levels of car-
cinogenic radon gas exposure (EPA 2016). Namibians who rely on 
locally grown and raised crops and livestock face the greatest risks. 
Heavy metals and radioactive residues produced during extraction, 
leaching, and processing can also contaminate groundwater and sur-
face water (Conde and Kallis 2012). Acidic tailings with known car-
cinogens have been identified near all active Namibian uranium 
mines (Wippel and Suchanek 2009). Because heavy metal residues 
and decayed radioactive elements produced during open-pit mining 
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are stored in ponds, they can also be lifted into the air with high 
winds and inhaled by humans and livestock. Airborne transmission 
risks are particularly high in the windy local desert environment. Ex-
posure is greatest for residents who are unable to seal their homes 
from windstorms, including those living in informal or indigenous 
shelters.  
Namibia’s Topnaar minority group, as also identified by Conde 
and Kallis (2012), is one example of a population that faces height-
ened environmental (desert-dwelling) and social risks (livestock-herd-
ing livelihood, indigenous shelters vulnerable to dust) from intensi-
fied uranium extraction. The Topnaar have little representation in 
national government and rely on livestock herding, which increases 
their exposure to uranium-associated air and water pollution. Uran-
ium mining’s water requirements have decreased the water available 
for their drinking, cooking, agriculture, and livestock needs (Anonym-
ous 11 2015). While Namibia has stricter environmental regulations 
for mining than many African states, Topnaar representatives indicat-
ed that their mining-related concerns often go ignored (Anonymous 
12 2014), and compensation for damages is rare (Anonymous 10 
2014). In dismissing the concerns of Topnaar communities, Namib-
ian officials argue that uranium mining is a necessary element of the 
state’s efforts to boost employment, reduce inequality, and catalyse 
development among proximate communities like the Topnaar 
(Anonymous 13 2015).  
Postcolonial scholars such as Mbembe (2001) use hybridity to 
highlight the complexity of exploitation in both formal colonialism 
and the postcolonial experiences that follow. Intensified uranium 
mining in Namibia, funded by Chinese investments and demand, has 
made it possible for the Namibian government to challenge historical 
mining-ownership patterns by playing a more direct ownership role in 
the industry. This situation, however, may result in the further exploi-
tation of minority populations such as the Topnaar, who are already 
marginalised in the global and national political economy. Moreover, 
by reinforcing the Namibian state as the provider of development for 
the Namibian people, projects like Husab may perversely make it 
more difficult for communities like the Topnaar to challenge mining-
as-development or to pursue alternative forms of development for 
themselves. Characterising the Husab mine as “neocolonial” exploita-
tion by China is an overgeneralisation given the challenge Husab 
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poses to historical uranium geopolitics and mining-ownership pat-
terns. It is equally clear, however, that, far from overturning all forms 
of mining-related exploitation in the spirit of “South–South solidar-
ity,” Husab may deepen historical inequalities associated with uran-
ium mining at the subnational level. The framework of hybridity, 
influenced by postcolonialism, STS, and political ecology, makes it 
possible to analyse both these complexities and their (geo)political 
ecological implications across multiple scales.  
Conclusion: The Implications of Rising China 
for Nuclear (Geo)Political Ecologies 
With full operations still months away, it is unclear how the Husab 
mine will affect Namibia’s development trajectory at national or sub-
national scales. Mining is a notoriously low-employment sector. The 
more than 10,000 promised jobs associated with the mine may or 
may not come to fruition. If they do come to fruition, they may or 
may not be permanent or employ Namibians (who may lack the 
technical skills necessary for higher-level positions). What is clear, 
however, is that there is much at stake materially, ecologically, and 
politically in association with China’s rising influence in Namibia’s 
uranium sector.  
The framework of hybridity, itself made hybrid through a com-
bination of scholarship from postcolonialism, STS, and political ecol-
ogy, provides a useful theoretical lens for analysing the complex im-
plications of China’s rising influence in Namibian uranium and be-
yond. As a hybrid of the human and the non-human, uranium is en-
dowed with multi-scalar and multi-actor meanings. For China, it is a 
means to solidify both its geopolitical and domestic power by ad-
dressing the pollution problems associated with its rapid growth – 
without sacrificing the pursuit of increased living standards and in-
dustrialisation. For Namibia’s SWAPO leaders, it is a revenue genera-
tor that is consolidating the political legitimacy of the state as the 
provider of mining-led development. For local communities, it is the 
materialisation of a politics of knowledge that prioritises economic 
growth above, or even at the cost of, alternative development aims 
such as health and environmental sustainability. While uranium min-
ing and its associated problems long predate Chinese investments in 
Namibia, Chinese investments have almost certainly saved the indus-
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try from collapse. Chinese investments in uranium are also facilitating 
the improved bargaining position of the Namibian state in the global 
economy – and perhaps even a future in which Namibia is a nuclear 
state in addition to a uranium-exporting one. At the same time, how-
ever, these investments appear to be deepening the exploitation of 
the very communities proclaimed to be their greatest beneficiaries.  
Like its increased role in uranium mining in Namibia, China’s 
global rise challenges simplistic binaries between the social and mate-
rial, the exploiter and the exploited, and the postcolonial state and the 
coloniser. The theoretical value of hybridity for analysing uranium 
mining is also valuable for analysing the (geo)political ecological im-
plications of China’s rising global influence. This hybrid framework 
can help us move beyond binary understandings (e.g. “development 
opportunity” versus “neocolonialism”) of what China’s rise entails 
for Africans. Providing an important antidote to framings of Africans 
as powerless victims of first the West and now China, postcolonial 
conceptions of hybridity also help us to better understand projects 
such as Husab as two-way engagements in which many actors have 
degrees of agency. As Robertson (2015) argues, nature and natural 
resources are “not simply the surface on which state strategy plays 
out, but […] an active and internal part of these strategies” (Robert-
son 2015: 457). It is likely that the Namibian government is not alone 
in using China’s rise to increase its power, political-economic options, 
and political legitimacy. While these new relations with China may 
not always fundamentally change exchange patterns, they do, as Mel-
ber (2011) argues, open up new political opportunities for African 
leaders. As predicted by Bryant and Bailey (1997), however, the multi-
scalar distribution of costs and benefits associated with China’s grow-
ing influence is unequal across multiple scales. In the case of Namib-
ia, this distribution may ultimately deepen rather than reduce inequali-
ties that predate Chinese investment while simultaneously increasing 
the power of the historically marginalised Namibian state and facili-
tating the rise of a non-Western global power. Like the fundamental 
contradiction of nuclearity identified by Hecht (2012), which sepa-
rates the benefits of nuclear power from individuals and communities 
essential to its production, this situation need not be paradoxical. 
Instead, through the lens of hybridity, we can use these contradic-
tions to better understand the complex (geo)political ecological impli-
cations of China’s rising global influence. 
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